N‐FIRM OLIGOPOLY WITH GENERAL ISO‐ELASTIC DEMAND

In this note oligopoly with iso‐elastic demand is analysed. Unlike previous studies we consider general iso‐elastic demand rather than the case of unit elasticity. An n‐firm Nash‐Cournot equilibrium for the case of heterogeneous constant marginal costs is derived. The main result is a closed‐form solution that shows the dependency of the equilibrium on the elasticity of demand and the share of industry costs. The result has applications to a wide range of areas in oligopoly theory by allowing comparisons across markets with different elasticities of demand.     

TEN YEARS OF GENERAL OLIGOPOLISTIC EQUILIBRIUM: A SURVEY

In this paper, I survey the recent and rapidly increasing theoretical literature using the brand‐new approach in embedding oligopolistic competition in general equilibrium, as designed by J. Peter Neary. First, I introduce the reader to Neary's approach, by describing the main ingredients. Then, I present a comprehensive set of studies that, over the last decade, apply this approach in different contexts, most of which are in open economy, and I examine the relevant outcomes. Although the theoretical literature has generously advanced, there is a lack of research on the empirical side, which would be an important area for future research besides theoretical extensions, some of which I highlight in the conclusions.     

Modeling and Measuring Economic Reality: Reply to the Reviews

To begin with, we'd like to express our appreciation to our three commentators for their thoughtful and helpful reviews. Like the founders of the subject, we believe, and our reviewers seem to agree, that structural econometrics has the potential to enable us to develop serious working models of how different economies actually operate, and also to tell us something about the changing patterns of their growth and transformation. But both we and our reviewers agree that there is a great deal wrong with the way econometrics is practiced today.     

Modelling regional policy scenarios in the agri-food sector: a case study of a Spanish region

The agri-food industry has several features of great importance for sustainable economic growth in rural areas. The objective of this work is to evaluate the effects associated with different scenarios of growth, and changes in the regional agri-food industry. These scenarios simulate changes in exports and imports, changes in technology and changes in the level of industrial integration. We develop a computable general equilibrium model calibrated for the region. Our results indicate that policies trying to improve the competitiveness and dynamism of strategic sectors as the agro-industrial complex in this regional economy exert positive effects on its growth and income, having notable impacts on local job markets but also in other sectors and activities linked through the whole production chain.     

On the emergence of scale-free production networks

We propose a simple dynamical model for the formation of production networks among monopolistically competitive firms. The model subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach à la Arrow–Debreu but displays a wide set of potential dynamic behaviors. It robustly reproduces key stylized facts of firms׳ demographics. Our main result is that competition between intermediate good producers generically leads to the emergence of scale-free production networks.     

Asymptotic stability of a general equilibrium under perfect and monopolistic competition

This study examines the asymptotic stability of a general equilibrium for an economy under perfect and monopolistic competition in which delays in a production process arise. Crucially, we find that the sufficient conditions for the stability of the equilibrium in each model differ markedly. For the stability of the equilibrium under perfect (monopolistic) competition, it is favorable that the slope of every demand curve is gradual (steep).     

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.     

Regular economies with ambiguity aversion

We consider a family of exchange economies with complete markets where consumers have multiprior preferences representing their ambiguity aversion. Under a linear independence assumption, we prove that regular economies are generic. Regular economies exhibit enjoyable properties: odd finite number of equilibrium prices, local constancy of this number, local differentiable selections of the equilibrium prices.Thus, even if ambiguity aversion is represented by non-differentiable multiprior preferences, economies retain generically the properties of the differentiable approach.     

Equilibrium theory under ambiguity

We extend the classical results on the Walras–core existence and equivalence to an ambiguous asymmetric information economy; that is, an economy where agents maximize Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). The interest of considering ambiguity arises from the fact that, in the presence of MEU decision making, there is no conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility (contrary to the Bayesian decision making). Our new modeling of an ambiguous asymmetric information economy necessitates new equilibrium notions, which are always efficient and incentive compatible.     

Arrow–Debreu equilibria for rank‐dependent utilities with heterogeneous probability weighting

We study Arrow–Debreu equilibria for a one‐period‐two‐date pure exchange economy with rank‐dependent utility agents having heterogeneous probability weighting and outcome utility functions. In particular, we allow the economy to have a mix of expected utility agents and rank‐dependent utility ones, with nonconvex probability weighting functions. The standard approach for convex economy equilibria fails due to the incompatibility with second‐order stochastic dominance. The representative agent approach devised in Xia and Zhou (2016) does not work either due to the heterogeneity of the weighting functions. We overcome these difficulties by considering the comonotone allocations, on which the rank‐dependent utilities become concave. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of comonotone Pareto optima, and derive their characterizing conditions. With the aid of the auxiliary problem of price equilibria with transfers, we provide a sufficient condition in terms of the model primitives under which an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium exists, along with the explicit expression of the state‐price density in equilibrium. This new, general sufficient condition distinguishes the paper from previous related studies with homogeneous and/or convex probability weightings.